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Imports as a Cause of Injury:
The Case of the U.S. Steel Industry
ABSTRACT
Recently, the United States International Trade Commission conducted a
Section 201 or "escape clause" hearing to determine whether imports have been the
most significant cause of injury to the US. steel industry. Thispaper suggests a
methodology for conducting the necessary analysis for such determinations, and
applies it to the case of the steel industry.
First, a reduced-form equation for steel industry employment is derived and
estimated. The equation specifies industry employment as a function of the price
of imported steel, the price of energy, the price of ironore, a time trend, real
income and (in one variant) the wage rate in the steel industry. The estimated
coefficients are used to perform counterfactual simulations, which allow us to
attribute changes in industry employment to their proximate causes. The analysis
reveals that for the period from 1976 to 1983, a secular shiftaway from
employment in the steel industry has been the most important cause of injury. For
the shorter period from 1979 to 1983, secular shift and import competitionare
roughly equal in importance, with the latter being entirely the result of the
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The charge of the International Trade Commission in the recent
"escape clause" hearings concerning the U.S. steel industry was to
determine whether imports have been the most significant cause of injury
to the industry. The ITC found positively in this case, and thus opened
the way for President Reagan to provide import protection for this
important domestic industry. In this paper, I present empirical evidence
that shows that the ITC ruling may have been in error.
The study uses an econometric model of the U.S. steel industry to
attribute changes in domestic employment to a number of proximate causes.
Among the potential contributors to the industry's employment decline
that I considered are (i) competition from imported steel, (ii) secular
decline of the steel industry (due, for example, to reduce demand for
steel by the U.S. automobile manufacturers and substitution of aluminum,
plastics and other mateials for steel in construction), (iii) the
cyclical drop in the demand for steel caused by the recent recession,
(iv) an upward trend in the wages paid to steel workers, and (v)
increases in the price of energy, an important input into steel
production. Looking first at the period from January 1976 through
October 1983, I have estimated that if not for the secular decline in the
industry there would have been approximately 209,000 more jobs in steel
at period's end. By contrast, intensification of import competition, as-2-
measured by the decrease in the real dollar price of foreign steel,
accounts for only 37,000 lost jobs during this period. The simulations
also show that had economic growth proceeded at a steady four percent
annual rate throughout the period, thereby averting the recession of 1981
to 1983, the October 1983 employment count in the U.S. steel industry
would have been some 27,000 higher than was actually observed. Finally,
I have estimated that a rise in steel industry wages at a rate greater
than that for the manufacturing sector at large accounts for slightly
more than 5000 lost jobs, and that the increase in the real cost of
energy during 1976 to 1983 is responsible for the loss of almost 4000
jobs.
In another set of estimates, I have studied the period from January
1979 to October 1983. For this shorter period secular decline again is
found to be the most significant cause of injury, responsible for
approximately 110,000 lost jobs. Import competition is next on the list
(81,000 jobs), followed in order to significance by the recession (49,000
jobs) and the rise in real energy prices (3000 jobs). By comparing the
figures for the two periods it becomes clear that competition from abroad
for U.S. steel producers actually abated during January 1976 through
January 1979, but intensified dramatically thereafter. In an effort to
explain this finding, I decomposed the decline in employment attributable
to the fall in the real dollar price of imported steel into three
components representing the portion due to the recent appreciation in the
value of the dollar, that due to changes in supply and competitive
conditions in foreign steel sectors (including any changes in alleged
unfair pricing practices) and that die to reductions in U.S. tariff rates
on steel imports. My conclusion is that the occurence of increasinglysevere competition from imports in this industry is entirely the result
of the dollar appreciation.I. INTRODUCTION
The allocation of resources in an open economy has many determinants. Among
these are the states of technology, tastes, factor accumulation, resource prices
and international competition, as well as the stage of the business cycle. A
change in any of these variables usually necessitates a reallocation of factors to
a new set of more profitable uses. As a result of this process of reallocation,
some sectors and factors gain, others lose. While long-run aggregate economic
welfare is maximized when complete adjustment to changing market conditions is
allowed to take place, the trade laws of the United States, perhaps in recognition
of the distributional considerations involved, provide for temporary safeguards
when increased international competition is the major cause of serious injury to a
U.S. Industry.
On January 24, 1984, Bethlehem Steel Corporation and the United Steel
Workers of America filed a petition with the International Trade CommissIon,
seeking import relief under Section 201 of the Trade Reform Act of 1974. The
provisions of this "escape clause" require the petitioners to establish that the
industry has experienced "serious material injury", and that imports are "a
substantial cause of that injury", where the latter phrase is defined as ta cause
that is important, and not less than any other cause". Thus, the law requires
that market conditions in the industry be analyzed, and that all developments be
attributed to their proximate causes. The purpose of this paper is to show how
such an analysis can be conducted rigorously and objectively using econometric and
1 . simulationtechniques. It is hoped that the method described here will be found
to be useful for the conduct of escape clause investigations in the future.
In order to determine whether or not import relief is justified under the
provisions of the Section 201 statute, it is necessary to account for all of the
events that have occurred in the international steel marketplace. In this paper I-2-
will concentrate solely on the evolution of industry employment, adapting for this
purpose the methodology that I previously developed for attributing employment
developments in an industry to their various structural causes (see Grossman,
1982). The methodology involves the econometric estimation of a reduced-form
employment equation for the industry, where the explanatory variables are those
exogenous (from the point of view of the industry) factors that affect the
allocation of resources to that industry. Once the empirical relationship between
employment and its determinants has been established, counterfactual simulations
can be performed in which the exogenous variables are allowed to follow paths that
are different from those that were actually observed. The deviation of the actual
path of employment from the simulated path reflects the effect on the number of
jobs in the industry that can be ascribed to the fact that the exogenous variable
took on its historical values, rather than the assumed alternatives.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II the
methodology is described, and the estimates of a reduced-form equationfor
employment in the U.S. steel mills products industry are reported. The
counterfactual simulations are presented in Section III. A concluding section
contains a discussion of the findings.
II. REDUCED-FORM ESTIMATES OF AN EMPLOYNENT EQUATION FOR TEE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY
The level of employment in the U.S. steel industry is the outgrowth of the
interaction between the supply of labor to this sector and the (derived) demand
for labor by firms active in the sector. These in turn depend upon such variables
as the state of technology, the wage rates in the steel industry and elsewhere,
the prices of the other inputs to the production of steel and the price of steel
output. Some of these variables are themselves endogenous, responding to
developments in the international and domestic steel markets. Indirectly then,-3—
employment is affected by all those factors that influence the supply of and the
demand for steel, such as the level of industrial activity, the exchange rate, and
the price of steel that is being offered to the market by the foreign competitors
of the U.S. producers.
If we are to attribute developments in the time path of industry employment
to their proximate causes, we might in principle wish to understand all of the
structural relationships that together determine the level of output of domestic
steel and the method of production that is used to manufacture that output. Such
a full-blown model of the steel industry would, however, be very difficult to
implement empirically, especially since data on many of the requisite variables
are not collected using a consistent definition of the industry. Fortunately,
there is a short-cut procedure available to us. The "cause—of-injury" question is
inherently a reduced-form one. That is, we are not interested per se in the
mechanism by which various disturbances affect the number of jobs in the industry,
but only in the ultimate quantitative effect of these exogenous shocks. All we
need do then to assess the total effect that a change in any given exogenous
variable is likely to have on industry employment is identify all of the
structural variables that influence the allocation of labor to the steel industry,
and estimate a reduced-form equation relating industry employment to these
exogenous variables. Once these relationships have been estimated, it is a
straightforward matter to ascertain what the effect on employment in the industry
has been of some particular development in the external environment. This is done
by specifying an alternative course for history, and then simulating the path of
employment under the maintained counterfactual. The deviation of the simulated
from the actual path of employment reveals the job loss (or gain) attributable to
the particular event under consideration.-4.-
The derivation of the reduced-form employment equation begins with the
specification of the production function for steel.3I assume that steel is
produced with five inputs: labor (L), capital (K),energy (E), iron ore (I)
and scrap steel (H). The production function is assumed to havea Cobb-Douglas
form,
(1) =AeittK1L2E3I4M1234
where it is the rate of Hicks-neutral technologicalprogress and t denotes time.
Energy and iron ore are assumed to be traded inputs, available to the steel
sector in infinitely-elastic supply at exogenous prices,e and respectively.
The quantity of each of these inputs used by aprofit-maximizing industry is found






where is the price of domestic steel.
Capital, labor and steel scrap are non-traded factors. The supply of
capital in the steel industry is taken to be exogenous in the shortrun, and is
assumed to grow at a steady trend rate (including depreciation) of ópercent per
unittime,
(4) K e(5t-5—








where w is the wage rate prevailing in the steel sector and is the price of
scrap. The domestic market for steel scrap is assumed to clear, whereby the price
is a function of the total amount consumed according to a supply relationship.
specify the supply function simply as
=NeYt(pJp)C
where a is the aggregate price level.
In this paper I consider two alternative treatments of the wage rate in the
steel industry. One possibility, following Grossman (1982), is to assume that
this variable is endogenous. Under this assumption, we need a structural equation
describing the supply of labor to the steel sector. A simple specification, which
allows for the possibility that labor is perfectly mobile between sectors in the
long run, but does not impose this restriction, is
d
(8) =L(w/p)
where La is the aggregate supply of labor and is assumed to grow at constant rate
-at a, i.e.LLe a a-6-
Alternatively,it has often been argued in the case of the U.S. steel
industry that wage rates are not determined in the usual way by the interaction of
the supply of and the demand for labor, but rather are a separate and relatively
exogenous factor that contributes to the evolution of employment in the industry.
Movements in these wages, it is claimed, are little affected by conditions in the
industry labor market, but rather reflect the relative negotiating success of the
steelworkers union vis-a-vis the steel producers, and the conditions in the U.S.
labor market at large.4If this view is correct, then the industry wage rate
belongs as a separate explanatory variable in the reduced-form employment
equation, and it would be appropriate to inquire into the extent to which wage
pressures are themselves a cause of injury. Indeed, some industry observers have
further claimed that it is excessive wage pressures that deserve primary blame for
the current plight of the U.S. steel industry. In order to evaluate this
argument, and not rule it out a priori, I choose to remain agnostic on whether the
industry wage rate should be treated as an exogenous or an endogenous variable, by
estimating the employment equations that follow from either assumption.
Finally, domestic steel is assumed to be an imperfect substitute for
importedsteel with exogenous price in foreign currency units, p. Thus, I am
assumingthat the excess supply of foreign steel to the U.S.marketis perfectly
elastic, which may be a very reasonable approximation given the degree of excess
capacity that has characterized steel production in many countries during the last
decade.5 Domestic steel also is assumed to substituteimperfectly for the
aggregate basket of domestic goods, so that the demand facing the domestic steel
industry (which in equilibrium is equal to its output) is given by:—7—





whereQ is aggregate industrial production, a measure of real industrial activity
that reflects the location of the demand curve for steel, E is the exchange rate,
t is the tariff rate applicable to U.S. steel imports and 4i is the rate of
secular demand shift. The latter incorporates the substitution of plastics and
aluminum for steel in construction, as well as the general down-sizing of
automobiles by the U.S. auto industry, two trends generally believed to be
responsible for a significant and persistent decline in the demand for steel in
recent years. Ideally it would have been preferable to identify these two effects
individually by including as separate variables in the demand equation the prices
of those materials that substitute for steel as well, as a measure of the state of
technical know-how in allowing such substitution, plus a measure of the size of
the average U.S. automobile, However, since our time series on employment is a
relatively short one, and since the secular trends in the demand for steel are
manifested rather slowly, it was not possible to treat these demand shifts
separately, but only to lump them with the other trend factors.
If the industry wage rate is considered to be an exogenous variable, then
equations (1) through (7) and (9) are eight equations which together determine the
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exogenous variables, 1e' a' E, p*, t, w and Q. The reduced-form equation
for employment is, after taking logs,
(10) log L = +a1t
+a2log(p /p ) + log(w /p ) +log(p./p)
+
a5log [Ep (1+t)/p ] +a6log Q-8—
Alternatively, if the wage rate is treated as an endogenous variable, then
equation (8) is added to the structural system, and the reduced-form equation does
not include the term a3 log (w/p).
An important thing to notice about the reduced-form equation for industry
employment is that the volume of steel imports does not appear explicitly. This
is because the volume of imports is itself an endogenous variable, influenced not
only by developments in the steel sectors outside the United States, but also by
events at home. For example, if technological advances were to raise the
productivity of labor in all domestic steel firms, there would be a simultaneous
increase in the number of jobs in the domestic industry and a decline in the level
of imports. It would of course be wrong in this case to attribute the gain in
employment to an abatement of import competition. It seems that when we seek to
implement the Section 201 statute requiring an assessment of the injury caused by
imports, we should identify the state of import competition not by the volume of
imports or by the extent of "import penetration", but rather by the location of
the foreign excess supply curve for steel. Then, if we are willing to assume that
this supply curve is perfectly elastic, we find that the real price of imported
steel is the appropriate measure of import competition that enters into the
reduced-form equation.
The reduced-form employment equation, in its two alternative forms, was
estimated using monthly observations from January 1973 through October 1983 (the
latest data available at the time of writing). The starting date was chosen
because prior to 1973 there were binding "voluntary" quotas in effect on exports
of steel to the United States.6When such quantitative restrictions are binding,
it is impossible to assume, as we have done, that the supply of foreign steel to
the U.S. market is perfectly elastic.-9—
Sincemonthly data were usedinthe estimation, it was necessary to
incorporate lags on all of the exogenous variables to reflect the period of
adjustment necessary to move from one long-run equilibrium to another. That is,
due to the existence of various rigidities in the marketplace (e.g.,long term
supply contracts, methods of production that are fixed in the short run, etc.), it
is exceedingly unlikely that the total cumulative effect on employment of a change
In one of the exogenous variables would be realized after one month. Instead, I
began by specifying an eighteen month lag structure for each of the exogenous
variables. Initial estimates showed, however, that full adjustment of employment
to changes in U.S. industrial activity and to changes in the realwage rate
occurred considerably sooner than eighteen months. The final specification
therefore Incorporated a period of adjustment of only five months for these
variables.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the regression results, let me briefly
describe the data that were used in the estimation. The dependent variable was
taken to be the (log of the) average weekly hours of employment by production
workers in the blast furnaces and steel mills industry (SIC 3312).8Both average
hours of employment per week and the total number of production workers were
collected from. the B.L.S. publication, Employment and Earnings. The net-of-tariff
dollar price of imported steel was calculated as a geometric weightedaverage of
the import unit values for three subcategories of steel product imports, as
reported in Highlights of U.S. Exports and Imports. The categories were (i)
tubes, pipes and fittings, (ii) universals, plates and sheets, and (iii) wire
rods, structurals, bars and pilings, and the weights were the import shares of
each of these categories for the year l977. The domestic price of imported steel
was adjusted for tariff changes, incorporating both the Nixon import surcharge and
the Tokyo Round tariff reductions. Average industry tariff rates were those-10-V
calculated for use in the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade (see
Deardorff and Stern, 1983). Finally, the entire series was deflated by the
aggregate producer price index (B.L.S., Producer Price and Price Indexes), to
express the prices in real terms.
The real industrial activity variable was the (log of the) Federal Reserve
Boards index of industrial production. The wage variable was the (log of the)
average hourly wage of production workers for SIC 3312, taken from Employment and
Earnings, and deflated by the aggregate producer price index. The price of iron
ore was similarly defined as a real magnitude, where the numerator was the iron
ore price series from Producer Price and Price Indexes. Finally, the price of
energy faced by the steel industry was constructed as a composite index of the
prices of coking coal, electric power, natural gas and residual fuels (all from
Producer Price and Price Indexes, and all deflated by theaggregate producer price
index). The weights used' in forming this index were the shares of these
individual inputs in the total per unitcostof energy used in steel production,
as computed by Duke et. al. (1977).
The coefficients from the reduced-form regressions are shown in Table 1. Two
sets of estimates are reported: the first column is for the regression that
included as an explanatory variable the realwage of steel workers; the second
regression excluded this variable. As is evident, the two sets of estimates for
the remaining coefficients are quite similar, so we will henceforth takeas our
preferred set the one that includes wage pressures as an independent cause of
employment changes. All of the coefficients, with the exception of that on the
time trend variable, are to be interpreted as elasticities. In addition, all of
the elasticities reported are "total e1asticitis", that is, the fullresponse of
employment to a change in the exogenous variable after complete adjustment has—11—
taken place. (The figures in parentheses below each of the coefficients are the
standard errors of the estimates.)
TABLE 1





















































The estimated reduced-form coefficients show thatemployment in the steel
industry is relatively sensitive to both business cycle fluctuations andimport
prices. The elasticity of employment with respect to industrialproduction is
estimated as 1.40, significant at the one-percent level. Thissuggests that
fluctuations in industrial activity have a more thanproportional effect on
employment in the steel sector. A one percent decline inimport prices will cause
a 1.067 percent fall in employment in the industry (againsignificant at the one
percent level), as import competition exerts downwardpressure on domestic steel
prices, and thus reduces the derived demand for labor in the domesticindustry.
This is a higher degree of sensitivity toimport competition than was found for
eight of the nine industries that I studied in Grossman (1982). Thisprobably
reflects the fact that domestic and imported steelare fairly close substitutes,
so that a fall in import prices exerts strong downwardpressure on the price of
domestically—produced steel.
The estimates show that there has been a downward trendin employment in the
U.S. steel industry. For the period fromJanuary 1973 to October 1983 we estimate
that even if all of the exogenous variables includedin the regression had
remained constant, employment would have fallen ata monthly rate of 0.751
percent. It would be useful to know what accounts for this secular shiftaway
from employment in the steel industry. Among thepossible contributing
explanations are a general economy-wide shift in employment to the servicesand
high-technology sectors, a trend substitution of aluminum, plastics and other
materials for steel, labor-saving technologicalprogress in steel production, and
a steady down-sizing of automobiles produced in the United States (automobiles
being a major source of demand for the output of the U.S. steel industry).
Unfortunately, the estimation of separate coefficients for each of these trend
variables must await the accumulation of additional data.-13-
Employment in the steel industry is found to be insensitive to the price of
energy inputs used in steel production, although the large standard error on the
parameter estimate leaves open the possibility that the elasticity is actually
somewhat larger. According to the estimated coefficient, the "output effect",
whereby an increase in energy prices makes domestic steel production less
profitable and decreases activity in the industry, is almost offset by the
"substitution effectt', whereby higher energy prices induce substitution of labor
for energy in the production process.
When industry wages are included as an exogenous determinant of industry
employment, the estimated elasticity is -.596. Thus, the total effect of an
exogenous increase of hourly wages of one percent would be a fall in hours of
employment of approximately six-tenths of one percent. As indicated above, this
labor demand response occurs largely within a five month period.
The final variable included in the reduced-form regressions was the real
price of iron ore. The cost of iron ore makes up a significant fraction of the
total unit cost of steel production, and possibilities for substitution for iron
ore in the production process are limited, so one would expect that an exogenous
increase in U.S. iron ore prices (everything else constant) would effect a fall in
steel output as steel production becomes less profitable. This in turn should mean
a decline in industry employment. However, our estimates show exactly the
opposite relationship between U.S. iron ore prices and employment in the U.S.
steel industry. A possible explanation for this anomoly is that iron ore prices
are not, in fact, exogenous with respect to developments in the U.S. steel
industry, as was assumed. If periods of great activity in the U.S. steel sector
are associated both with high employment and upward pressure on world iron ore
prices, then we would observe a positive correlation between these two variables,-14-
although it would not be correct to attribute the increase in either of them to
the rise in the other.
III. COUNTERFACTUAL SIMULATIONS
The U.S steel industry has experienced a decline in employment of more than
200,000 production workers during the period from 1973 to 1983. In order to
attribute this decline in employment to its various causes, it is necessary to
specify an historical counterfactual. That is, we need to compare the actual path
of employment with what might have been under an assumed alternative industry
development. In this section we calculate the loss of employment that can be
explained by import competition, by secular shift in factor allocation, by the
recent recession in the United States, by real wage pressures and by movements in
the real price of energy. In each case we specify an alternative path for the
exogenous variable of interest, assuming, for example, no intensification of
import competition, no secular shift out of steel employment, steady four percent
amiual growth in real output, etc. We simulate the path of the dependent variable
(hours of employment) using the actual and the assumed counterfactual values for
the exogenous variables, and identify the difference between the two sets of
predicted values as the relevant effect on employment. Finally, we can subtract
this employment effect from the actual path of industry employment to arrive at a
prediction of what employment would have been under the counterfactual assumption.
For each variable we take two alternative starting points for our
simulations: January 1976 and January 1979. The shorter period coincides with
the major part of the decline in employment in the U.S. steel industry since 1973,
while the longer period can be justified on the grounds that it incorporates
roughly one complete evolution of the business cycle. This is also the period
designated by the petitioners to the ITC in the recent escape clause hearings.-15-
A. Employment Loss Due to Import Competition
As I have argued above, it would be inappropriate to identify import
competition with the volume of imports, since the latter is an endogenous variable
influenced by developments in both the domestic and foreign industries, as well as
by changes in domestic and foreign demand. Instead, we should attribute job
losses in the domestic industry to an intensification of import competitiononly
when there has been a shift in the foreign excess supply curve. Sincewe have
assumed that this supply curve is perfectly elastic, we must specify our
counterfactual in terms of movements In the price of imported steel.
The price of imported steel to domestic consumers is the product of three
separate components. A decline in any of these components will induce a shift in
demand towards imported steel, and thus exert downwardpressure on the price of
the domestic product. These components are(1) the foreign currency price of
steel produced abroad for export to the United States, as determined by supply and
demand conditions in the foreign steel sectors, (ii) the exchangerate, expressed
in dollars per unit of foreign currency, and (iii) one plus the ad valorem rate of
tariff protection applied to steel imports. Thus, the job loss associated withan
intensification of import competition is really the sum of three separate effects:
that of exchange rate movements, that of tariff reductions, and that of
developments in the foreign steel sectors.
There remains the question of whether, for purposes of anescape clause
determination, import competition as a cause of injury should be measured
inclusive or exclusive of the effect of exchange rate movements. Unfortunately,
the statutory language provides no explicit guidance concerning the treatment of
exchange rate changes, nor does the legislative history of Section 201 shed any
light on this matter.'°One could argue on economic grounds that escape clause
protection ought not be granted when appreciation of the domestic currency is the-16-
cause of injury to a domestic industry. The reason is that a real appreciation of
a currency effects a worsening of the country's competitive position across a wide
range of industries, including virtually all tradable goods sectors. Selective
import protection would cause the currency to appreciate even further, and would
shift the burden of adjustment to whatever macroeconomic events that caused the
initial appreciation onto the other, already-injured exportable and non—protected
importable industries. In other words, when exchange rate movements impart harm
across the entire spectrum of tradable goods industries, the justification of
escape clause protection on distributional grounds is weak, since any aid to one
injured industry comes at the expense of others in a similar position.
Nonetheless, the issue is essentially a legal one that is as yet unresolved, so I
will proceed to quantify the job loss in the U.S. steel industry attributable to
import competition under both alternative treatments of the recent appreciation of
the dollar.
The total effect of import competition (including the exchange rate effects)
on steel industry employment cn be found by simulating hours of employment under
the counterfactual assumption that the real dollar price of imported steel
remained unchanged. This assumption implies a stable foreign excess supply curve
when drawn in the space of (real) U.S. dollars. In one simulation we set the
dollar price of imported steel (deflated by the domestic producer price index)
equal to its value in January 1976 for the entire period from then until October
1983. The second simulation was conducted similarly, but under the assumption of
no intensification or abatement of import competition since January 1979. The
actual and predicted paths of employment (measured in manhours per week) are shown
in Figures 1 and 2.11
Evidently, intensification of import competition has been responsible for a
substantial loss of employment in the U.S. steel industry, but only when 1979 is—17—
taken as the base year. The figures show the effects of import competition on
employment being concentrated during the last quarter of 1980 and the first
quarter of 1981, and again during the first three quarters of 1983. We find that
if the price of imported steel had risen at the rate of inflation of the domestic
price index since 1979, the average level of production employment during August
through October, 1983 would have been 11.64 million hours per week, rather than
the actual average of 8.40 million hours. If import competition had remained at
its 1976 level in the intervening years, the figure would have been 9.90 million
hours per week. Dividing the figures for hours of employment by the observed
average number of hours per worker per week in each month, we arrive at a figure
of 80,959 for the job loss attributable to intensification of import competition
since 1979. The analagous figure for the loss since 1976 is 37,403 jobs.
The timing of the import competition effect seems to coincide with the
periods of rapid appreciation of the dollar. To see how much of the effect of
import competition on steel industry employment can be attributed solely to
movements of exchange rates, we constructed an index of the dollar value of
foreign currency by weighting the bilateral dollar exchange rates for fifteen
major steel exporters by the share of each of these countries in U.S. steel
imports. We then simulated steel industry employment under the alternative
assumptions that the dollar maintained its value as of January 1976 and as of
January 1979 (i.e. we assumed that no dollar appreciation or depreciation took
place in the intervening years). In these simulations, the foreign currency price
of imported steel and the tariff rate applicable to steel imports were allowed to
take on their historical values. The results of these simulations are shown in
Figures 3 and 4.
We find that a large part of the total effect of import competition on
employment since 1976 is attributable to the appreciation of the dollar. Had the-18-
dollar remained at its January 1976 level, there would have been (on average)
29,037 more jobs in the U.S. steel industry during August through October, 1983.
When we take 1979 as our base, the results are even more striking. Appreciation
of the dollar since then has been responsible for the loss of 82,701 jobs in the
U.S. steel industry (average for August to October, 1983), which accounts for more
than the full effect attributable to import competition during these years.
Our next counterfactual simulation assumed only the absence of the Tokyo
Round tariff reductions. The average employment loss attributable to the decreased
rate of protection of the domestic steel industry after 1979 is 1,216 job.
Subtracting the exchange rate effect and the tariff reduction effect from the
total import competition effect, we conclude that very little of the decline in
employment in the U.S. steel industry can be explained by a change in supply and
demand conditions in the steel sectors outside the United States. The shift in
the foreign excess supply curve drawn in the space of real foreign currency units
accounts for only 7,150 of the jobs lost since 1976. And, if we take January 1979
as our baseline date instead, and ask what would have occurred had the foreign
currency price of U.S. steel imports grown at the same rate as the aggregate U.S.
producer price index, we find that the industry would have had on average 2,958
fewer jobs during August through October, 1983 than was actually the case. In
other words, leaving aside the effects of exchange rate appreciation and the
reductions in tariff rates, import competition actually has abated somewhat since
1979.
B. Employment Loss Due to Secular Shift
The reduced-form regression coefficient indicates that employment in the
U.S. steel industry has been declinIng by more than 0.75 percent per month for
reasons that, for the purposes of this study, can on1y be described as long-term—19—
secular shift. As discussed above, the time trend variable picks up the effect of
changes in technology, shifts of the demand for steel, and structural reallocation
of resources into growth sectors such as services and high-technology products.
Had the time trend in industry employment been zero since January 1976,
weekly hours of employment by production workers would have averaged 16.76 million
during August through October 1983. Similarly, we estimate that employment during
this period would have averaged 12.79 million production hoursper week had the
secular shift been absent only since January 1979. These figures translate into
an employment loss of 208,734 jobs and 109,600 jobs, respectively.
C. Employment Loss Due to Sluggish Real Income Growth
Steel is an important intermediate input to many industrial activities in
the U.S. economy. It is not surprising, therefore, that employment in the
industry is sensitive to the stage of the business cycle. When industrial
activity is depressed, demand for steel will be so as well, and workers in the
U.S. industry will be laid off as a result.
We conducted several simulations to ascertain the implications for steel
employment of the recent U.S. recession. In one pair of simulations we assumed a
steady rate of growth of real industrial production of four percent per annum.
Had such growth occurred from January 1979 through October 1983, theaverage level
of employment in the last three months of our time period would have been 10.37
million hours per week. Thus, the recession during this period is responsible for
a decline in employment of 49,251 workers. Replacing the actual path of real
income growth since January 1976 by a path exhibiting a steady four percent growth
per year yields an estimate for the average level of employment during August
through October 1983 of 9.48 million hours per week. This employment level would
have meant 27,031 more jobs. The difference between these two counterfactuals-20-
arises because the former assumes away the most recent recession while still
allowing for the boom that immediately preceded it, while the latter considers a
steady path of growth between roughly comparable points in the business cycle.
A second pair of simulations was conducted under the more conservative
assumption of three percent annual growth in real icome. If such had been the
case since January 1979, the average August-October 1983 number of jobs would have
been 33,577 greater than was actually observed. Three percent growth of
industrial production for the entire period since January 1976 would have meant
3,777 more jobs on average during the period from August through October, 1983.
D. Employment Loss Due to Wage Pressures
Some observers have attributed much of the loss of employment in the U.S.
steel industry in recent years to the movement of wages in that industry. The
claim is that the steelworker's union has been unusually successful at the
bargaining table, and that the resulting wage hikes have caused steel
manufacturers to substitute for labor in the production process. We investigated
the validity of these claims by simulating a path for industry employment under
the counterfactual assumption that wage growth in the industry was exactly equal
to the average wage growth for all private, non-agricultural workers. If this had
been the case during the period from January 1976 thorugh October 1983, there
would have been only 5,047 more jobs in the U.S. steel industry during the last
three months of theperiod. Industry wage growth equal to average since Janaury
1979 would actually have meant 4,101 fewer jobs in the U.S. steel industry.
Evidently, the rate of wage increase in recent years in the steel industry has
been fairly close to the average for private, non-agricultural workers, so that
not much of the industry's recent employment decline can be explained in this way.-21-
It should be pointed out that our wage figures are for directcompensation,
and do not include fringe benefits. To the extent that benefitshave increased at
a faster rate in the steel industry than elsewhere in theeconomy, it is possible
that this has been responsible for some of the loss inindustry employment.12
E. Employment Loss Due to Increase in the Price ofEnergy
Our final pair of simulations was intended tomeasure injury caused by
increases in the price of energy faced by producers ofsteel.As for the other
variables, we conducted our analysis with starting dates ofJanuary 1976 and
January 1979. In each case we assumed in our counterfactua].comparisons that the
composite price of energy inputs grew at a rate equal to therate of inflation of
the aggregate producer price index. We found thatan increase in relative energy
prices since 1976 can explain the loss of 3,582 jobs in the U.S.steel industry.
Had the relative price ofenergy remained at its January 1979 level throughout the
period since then, there would have been an estimated 2,966more jobs in the
industry (on average) during August through October, 1983.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The findings from the counterfactual analysisare summarized in Table 2.
The table shows the total loss ofemployment, measured in numbers of production
workers, that can be attributed to each of the proximatecauses discussed above.
I report in the table only the cumulative effectas of August-October 1983, for
the two alternative choices of starting dates.
The analysis shows that for the period from 1976 to 1983the most important
cause of injury to the U.S. steel industry has been ageneral secular shift away
from employment in this sector.'3 This trendincorporates several factors,
including possibly a labor-saving change in the productiontechnology, faster than-22-
average growth of employment and productivity in the high-technology and service
sectors (which has meant that resources have been drawn away from more traditional
manufacturing industries), and a slow decline in the demand for domestic steel not
explained by either relative price or real income movements.14
For the period since 1979 the evidence is mixed. Our estimates show that
secular factors have been quantitatively most significant even during this shorter
time period. Intensification of import competition has had nearly as large an
impact during this period, with the difference falling well within the confidence
interval for our analysis.15
TABLE 2
CAUSES OF INJURYTOTIlEU.S.STEEL INDUSTRY
ESTIMATED JOB LOSS BASE PERIOD
(Average for Aug—Oct 1983) January 1976 January 1979
Import Competition, of which: 37,403 80,959
Exchange Rate Appreciation 29,037 82,701
U.S. Tariff Reductions 1,216 1,216
Shift in Foreign Supply 7,150
-2,958
Secular Shift 208,734 109,600
Sluggish Real Income Growth
Assuming "Normal" Growth of 4% p.a. 27,031 49,251
Assuming "Normal" Growth of 3% p.a. 3,777 33,577
Wage Pressures 5,047
-4,101
Increase in Relative Price of Energy 3,582 2,966-23-
I have argued further that the import competition effect is actually the sumof
three separate components: the effect of shifts in the foreign excess supply
curve for steel (in foreign currency units), the effect of exchange rate changes
and the effect of U.S. tariff reductions. Of these, only the sharp appreciation
of the dollar in the last four years can be held responsible for the loss of a
significant number of jobs in the U.S. steel industry. Movements in the foreign
excess supply curve account for the loss of only 7,150 steel industry jobs since
1976, and in the period since January 1979, import competition measured in this
way has actually abated somewhat.
What does the analysis imply about the merits of the Section 201 escape
clause case heard recently by the U.S. International Trade Commission? Clearly,
the period of analysis is important. The petitioners cited the period since 1976
as the relevant one. During this time, import competition cannot be considered to
be the most important cause of injury to the U.S. steel industry; the secular
decline that the industry has been undergoing for more than a decade has been
responsible for the loss of more than five times as many jobs as has the
intensification of import competition. In the most recent four years, however,
import competition and secular decline have been roughly equal as causes of injury
to the industry. But the injury due to import competition during this period is
entirely the result of the more-than- thirty-percent real appreciation of the U.S.
dollar. Thus, escape clause protection could only be justified under the Section
201 statute if it were determined on legal grounds that exchange rate effects do
qualify as !?injury caused by imports", despite sound economic arguments that
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Footnotes
1.Historically, the International Trade Commmission, in making its Section 201
determinations, has relied heavily on the subjective testimony of industry
experts, and on other more casual forms of industry analysis. Incidentally,
on June 12, 1984 the I.T.C. found in favor of the petitioners in the case
that is the subject of this paper. As of the time of this writing, the
Commission is deliberating on the form of protection to recommend to the
President.
2. Note that, in principle, this same methodology could be used to analyze other
industry developments besides employment, such as the evolution of industry
production, sales, profits, etc. An initial attempt was made to estimate a
reduced-form equation for steel sector sales, using tons of carbon steel
shipments (as reported by the American Iron and Steel Institute) as the
endogenous variable. However, the equation left much of the variance in
shipments unexplained, and most of the estimated reduced-form coefficients
had large standard errors (in several cases, larger than the absolute value
of the estimated coefficient). For this reason, we did not proceed with the
simulations of steel shipments, concentrating instead on the employment
equations for which the estimation yielded a better fit and more precise
estimates of the parameters.
3. The derivation of the reduced-form equation and the justifications for some
of the assumptions are kept intentionally brief. The interested reader is
referred to Grossman (1982) for a more detailed discussion.
4. It would also be appropriate to treat wages in the steel industry as
exogenous if labor is highly mobile and if the steel industry is small in
relation to the U.S. economy. A high degree of intersectoral labor mobility—29—
is consistent with the findings of Grossman (1982). Nine U.S. industries
were studied there, and it was found that the price of imports had a
non-negligible effect on the industry wage rate in only one of these.
5. The trigger price mechanism, in force since the mid-19701s, also contributes
to a high elasticity of supply of imported steel into the United States. The
trigger prices essentially serve as a price floor for European of Japanese
steel in the U.S. market, so that even if the import supply curves from these
sources would be upward sloping in its absence, they would be perfectly
elastic in the neighborhood of equilibrium whenever the policy isbinding.
6. In fact, VER's continued to place an upper bound on imports fromsome foreign
suppliers until the end of 1974. However, Crandall (1981, p.103) has shown
in his careful study of the U.S. steel industry that the quantitative
restrictions were binding before 1972, but ceased to be so after that date.
7. The lag structures for import prices, for the price ofenergy and for the
price of iron ore were specified as fourth-degree polynomial-distributed
lags. Those for wages and real industrial activity were estimated as
five-month free lags. In addition, the equations included a constantterm,
and were corrected for first-order serial correlation of the residualsusing
an iterative, maximum-likelihood procedure.
8.SIC 3312 was selected over SIC 331 (blast furnaces and steel products)
because 3312, by excluding some fabricators, is closer to theindustry at
issue in the recent escape clause proceedings.
9. It would have been preferable to use actual import prices, rather thanan
index of unit values. However, the B.L.S. series for U.S. importprices by
industry are too short to allow us to estimate the reduced-form regressions.
Another possibility would be to use export prices of steel forour trade
partner countries. Export prices for continental European steel are-30-
available in the Metals Bulletin. However, the data series are not complete.
Another problem with using these data would be that the existence of the U.S.
trigger prices mechanism during our sample period suggests that European
steel prices averaged across all export markets are a poor proxy for the
price of European steel delivered to the U.S. market. In defense of the use
of unit values in this case, it can be argued that foreign steel is a
relatively homogenous product, so that changes in the value of shipments for
a given quantity sold are unlikely to reflect changes in the quality of the
product. Duke et. al. (1977) found that unit values tracked the prices
reported in the Metals Bulletin fairly closely after a lag of three months.
10. Note that Congressional debate on the Trade Reform Act of 1974 took place
during a period of fixed exchange rates.
11. Recall that the predicted path of employment under the counterfactual
assumption of no intensification of import competition is found by
subtracting from the actual employment values the difference between the
simulated values using assumed and historical values for the exogenous
variables. In effect, we add back in the residual from the reduced-form
regressions in forming our prediction of "what would have been" under the
assumed counterfactual.
12. Unpublished data from the Office of Productivity and Technology of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics shows that total compensation for production workers in
the steel industry has increased by 94.5 percent from 1976 to 1983. The same
source reports an increase of 81.1 percent in total compensation to all
employees in manufacturing industries in the United States during this
period. If total compensation in the steel sector had grown at this slower
(average for all sectors) rate, and if the estimated wage elasticity of -.596
can be assumed to apply to total compensation, then an additional 4.1 percent—31—
of the employment in 1976 would have been preserved in 1983. This amounts to
approximately 15,000 jobs, as compared to the figure of 5046 for wage
pressure alone.
13. A one-tailed t-test of the hypothesis that the estimated job loss
attributable to import competition is greater than or equal to that
attributable to secular shift for the period 1976 to 1983 can be rejected at
the 99% significance level.
14. A rough calculation using data from Ward's Automotive Yearbook on pounds of
steel in the "typical" U.S. car and on total car and truck production by the
U.S. automobile industry, and assuming (arbitrarily) that the employment
elasticity with respect to steel output is one, would suggest that the
reduction in demand for steel by the U.S. automobile industry (due to both
the down-sizing of cars and the retrenchment in the industry) could account
for as much as one-quarter of the job loss attributed to secular decline.
15.It is impossible to reject the hypothesis at even the eighty precent level of
significance that the employment effect of secular shift and that of import
competition are equal for the period 1979 to 1983.-32—
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